This is the original English draft of my article, later revised and translated into French by Anne-Sophie Aboké, and published as part of the special issue “Retour vers le futur: Les cultural studies et l’école de Birmingham”, edited by Maxime Cervulle and Nelly Quemener (Poli – Politique des Cultural Studies, no. 15, March 2023).
The published version is available in French here: https://polirevue.files.wordpress.com/2023/03/dawes-def.pdf
The whole issue is available open access here: https://polirevue.wordpress.com/anciens-numeros/568-2/
Is Macron a Neoliberal? Stuart Hall and Neoliberal Conjunctures
Simon DAWES, UVSQ
Summary:
Are we still neoliberal today? Is Emmanuel Macron a neoliberal? In his critiques of neoliberal
conjunctures in the UK, from Margaret Thatcher through Tony Blair to David Cameron, Stuart
Hall demonstrated how neoliberal ideology is capable of evolving, transforming and even
disguising itself, in relation to other ideologies. This article engages with the theoretical and
methodological debates on neoliberalism to better understand the contemporary neoliberal
conjuncture. Not to answer the question, are we still neoliberal today, but to understand how
neoliberalisation is articulated with illiberal discourses today.
Keywords: Stuart Hall, neoliberalism, ideology, governmentality, discourse
Is Macron a neoliberal? Is Trump? Will Brexit mean more or less neoliberalism? ‘Neoliberalism’ is a word that often reveals more about those using it (or refusing to use it) than it does about what it is used to describe. Up until the 2008 financial crisis, it was regularly used by critics of the Anglo-Saxon model who saw it being imposed everywhere, and ridiculed as a meaningless term by those who saw no evidence of it existing anywhere. Immediately following the crisis, there was a brief period of soul searching among media and political elites with even the IMF belatedly acknowledging the pertinence of the term and questioning the wisdom of neoliberal assumptions (Ostry et al. 2016), while its critics anticipated a Berlin Wall moment and the imminent decline of the neoliberal epoch. This in turn was followed, however, by state intervention to save the banks, the finance sector and the status quo, and to impose a decade of austerity on the public. Far from signalling the end of neoliberalism, the crisis merely gave rise to a reconfiguration of its forms and logics, with some seeing evidence of the emergence of ‘hard’ or ‘authoritarian’ neoliberalism (Bilgic, 2018; Tansel, 2019; Fabry 2018; Fabry, 2019; D. Fassin, 2019; E. Fassin, 2019); although such characteristics have been part of the neoliberal revolution since its earliest appearance in the US/UK-backed Chilean coup in the 1970s.
Partly in response to this, we’ve seen the election of Trump and the vote for Brexit in the heart of the Anglo-Saxon models, expressed and understood by some as those ‘left behind’ by the neoliberal pursuit of economic growth and inequality fighting back. But around the world, the re-emergence of fascism, nativist isolation, white supremacy, ‘populist’ political parties, ‘fake news’ and distrust of both liberal democratic politicians and the mainstream media of the liberal public sphere (in short, the re-emergence of everything that is supposedly contrary to neoliberalism) have gone hand in hand with a continuation of the neoliberal status quo. Instead of alternatives to neoliberalism, we have seen the harder to comprehend mixture of neoliberalism in practice alongside the rhetorical denunciation of neoliberal policies and elites. Is this still neoliberalism, is it more or less neoliberal than what had come before, or is it enough to constitute the emergence of something called post-neoliberalism?
To fully grasp the contemporary moment, it is important to acknowledge that contradiction has always accompanied neoliberalism, and to look closely at such contradictions and the ways in which disparate values are (re)articulated. Critical engagement with the work of Stuart Hall provides a good basis on which to do this, and this short article will present the contribution that Hall has made to the critique of neoliberalism, focusing on his Gramscian approach to understanding neoliberalism in terms of ideology and hegemony, and his concerted efforts to capture the ‘conjunctural’ features of each reconfiguration of neoliberal hegemony. The article will begin with an outline of how neoliberalism is generally understood in the academic literature, before developing the various theoretical approaches to its critique; in the second part, I will present Hall’s distinctive contribution to analysing neoliberalism in terms of ideological conjunctures.
Contestation
‘Neoliberalism’ is a contested term. For many on the right, it is little more than an expression of contempt by the left for anything with which they disagree. The critique of neoliberalism in academic scholarship is thus seen as ideological, partisan and ‘unscientific’, whereas the denial of its existence and refusal to engage with such scholarship is somehow objective and neutral. Nowhere is this more noteworthy than in the discipline of history, where there appears to have been a concerted effort to avoid the term and deny its existence (Diamond, 2020). As such, we have had to turn to other disciplines to read about the history of neoliberalism, of which there is now a rich body of literature (Burgin, 2015; Davies, 2014; Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009; Peck, 2010; Jones, 2012). It is now undeniable that ‘something called neoliberalism’ (Collier, 2012: 191) has existed as a distinct political project that reshaped Western and global political economy from the 1970s onwards; this had its intellectual origins in 1920s and 1930s debates about the nature of liberalism and its antagonistic relationship with socialism, among thinkers (Friedman, 1951, 1962; Hayek, 1944, 1960) who were committed to both a revival of classical liberal ideas and a critical evaluation of the legacies of laissez-faire liberalism (Phelan and Dawes, 2018). As such, it is important to avoid conflating neoliberalism with classical liberalism: neoliberalism does not believe that there is a private realm that the state should not touch; it believes that it is the state’s role to ensure that both public and private realms are organised insofar as is possible in terms of markets, contracts and competition.
But not everyone who uses the term is familiar with this history. The term has certainly become widespread and applied to a wide variety of phenomena, and it is often used badly, but this varies from one discipline to another, and the flippant dismissal of the term betrays just as much ignorance on the part of researchers who refuse to use it as on those that use it lazily. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the term is over-used and abused, and thus understandable that it is treated with suspicion for its ‘totalizing reach, eliding of other histories, and application to almost everything today’ (Allison & Piot, 2011: 5). For Terry Flew (in Dawes & Flew, 2016), for instance, the term’s use has become ‘sloppy’. It is “routinely invoked to explain everything from the rise of Bollywood themed weddings to competitive cooking shows to university departmental restructurings,” and the propensity to “lapse into a kind of conspiracy theory is readily apparent.” He has criticised the tendency of many scholars to use the term as a conceptual trash-can, “…into which anything and everything can be dumped, as long as it is done with suitable moral vehemence”.
When greater specification is provided, neoliberalism’s essential features are ‘variously described, but always include’ (Ferguson, 2009: 170): consumer choice (Harvey, 2007 :42); private ownership and property rights, free trade, free markets, privatisation, and state withdrawal from social provision (Harvey, 2007: 2); deregulation, the restriction of state intervention, opposition to collectivism, emphasis on individual responsibility and a belief that economic growth leads to development (Hilgers, 2011: 352); valorisation of private enterprise over the state, tariff elimination, currency deregulation and enterprise models that run the state like a business (Peck, 2008); a logic of ‘DIP (deregulation, individualisation, privatisation)’ (Bauman & Rovirosa-Madrazo, 2010: 52); as well as an emphasis on the entrepreneurial self; and the social scientist’s particular bugbear regarding Thatcher’s claim that there is ‘no such thing as society’ (Mirowski, 2013). More broadly, neoliberalism is seen as the reinvention of the classical liberal tradition, expanded to encompass the whole of human existence, whereby the market stands as the ultimate arbiter of truth, and where freedom is recoded to mean anything the market allows (Mirowski, 2013). Other uses of ‘neoliberalism’ see it as shorthand for a new era of capitalism in more speculative times, or as an abstract and external causal force, often little more than a ‘sloppy synonym’ for capitalism or the world economy and its inequalities (Ferguson, 2009: 171).
Despite the term being “ubiquitous and promiscuous, reductive and overblown, totalising and eliding of other histories while lacking in geopolitical specificity” (Dawes, 2020), Hall (for one) argued that the phenomena it signifies possess enough common features to warrant at least a provisional conceptual identity (Hall, 2011: 706). Insisting on the political and analytical necessity of naming neoliberalism – as much for left-wing activists as for academic researchers – he was nevertheless explicit that this had to be more than just name-calling, which would risk missing what was specific to a particular moment (Hall, 1979: 15), and, invoking Gramsci, he reminded us that we need to address ourselves violently towards “everything particular and specific to this historical conjuncture” if we are serious about transforming it (Hall, 1979: 14).
For Hall, this entailed recognising that in “…ambition, depth, degree of break with the past, variety of sites being colonised, impact on common sense and everyday behaviour, restructuring of the social architecture…” (Hall, 2011: 727–728), neoliberalism is an ideological and hegemonic project (Hall, 2011: 728; Harvey, 2007: 3) to disembed capital from the constraints of Keynesian interventionism (Harvey, 2007: 11), and to oversee ‘the shift of power and wealth back to the already rich and powerful’ (Hall, 2011: 721; Harvey, 2007: 42). The approach of scholars such as Hall and David Harvey have since become hegemonic in themselves, with adding their names as references after each occurrence of the term ‘neoliberalism’ becoming the default convention for critical scholarship, whether or not the authors of such scholarship would otherwise commit to such a Marxist approach to explaining social phenomena.
But it is also necessary to read beyond the limits of a particular discipline or approach to learn about the differences between competing schools of neoliberal thought and the variations in the ways in which neoliberalism is enacted in society and everyday life from one context to another, as well as about the theoretical and methodological debates on how to research and critique neoliberalism, including debates on the extent to which the term is or remains useful or accurate (see the contributions in Dawes & Lenormand, 2020). Hall’s position was critiqued by the ‘Anglo-Foucauldians’ (Barry et al, 1996; Rose, 1999; Miller & Rose, 2008), for example, for failing to see neoliberalism as anything other than such an ideological and hegemonic project (Barry et al, 1996: 11). In contrast, their critique of neoliberal governmentality highlighted the productive, individualising aspects of power and the ethical and technical character of neoliberalism without needing to refer to ideology (Miller & Rose, 2008: 4). For proponents of this approach, neoliberalism is but one of many strands of a complex of individualised governmentalities, and never more than a flexible assemblage of technologies, routines and conducts (Peck, 2013a: 3). Today, there remain these two broad approaches to critiquing neoliberalism: either as ideology or as governmentality. While the former are criticised for their mistaken emphasis on misrepresentation and a purposeful project, and the latter are criticised for failing to account adequately for power relations, both have taken issue with ‘template’ models of neoliberalism that reduce it to the kind of explanatory attributes I have listed above.
Tensions have persisted – between those that emphasise the need to bear in mind the bigger picture and the undeniable trends that have transcended context, and those that focus on the minutiae of contextual variation; between broadly structural and poststructural accounts of neoliberalism and neoliberalisms; between those that critique neoliberalism as an ideological and hegemonic project, and those that analyse it as a form of governmental rationality (Dawes, 2020) – and constructive dialogue between them had until recently been rare. More recently, however, there have been efforts to bridge the methodological, epistemological and ontological gap between these contrasting approaches (Larner, 2003; Peck, 2004), to rethink the terms of debate (Brenner et al, 2010; Dean, 2012), to produce ‘amalgamated interpretations’ or hybridized syntheses (Springer, 2012: 137), and to privilege the ‘context of context’, emphasising the links between the local and the global, and seeking to trace the relations between ‘hybrids among hybrids’ (Peck, 2013). Along with Nik Theodore and Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck has made the most concerted attempt to find a compromise between contrasting approaches to the study and critique of neoliberalism (Collier 2012: 188), accommodating a fluid and variegated appreciation of contextual difference while maintaining a structural approach that recognises the ways in which local differences and contextually embedded forms are shaped by wider processes (Brenner et al, 2010). This has entailed supplementing the critical history of the contradictory ‘origins, tenets and imperatives’ of neoliberalism (Collier, 2012: 194) with the identification of the recurring commonalities of neoliberalism in the ‘cumulative ideological/institutional realignments’ of successive governments, as well as in the ‘relational interpenetration of governing logics and routines’ across spatial contexts (Peck, 2013: 142).
In the next section, however, I’d like to demonstrate that Hall’s own critiques of neoliberalism were not as heavy-handed as the governmentalists would have us believe, and that they actually anticipated many of the recent efforts at rapprochement between the two approaches.
Conjunctures
Although much of the literature on neoliberalism, particularly in my field of media and communication studies, is ostensibly ‘critical’ (with those obligatory references to Hall and Harvey), the discursive substitution of ‘neoliberalism’ for ‘capitalism’ has caused concern among explicitly Marxist scholars (Garland and Harper, 2012) because the concept of neoliberalism sometimes presupposes a simplistic state/free market binary that obscures the role of the state in maintaining the capitalist system. Contrary to the assumption that the dominant theoretical account of neoliberalism has been ‘Marxist’ (see Flew, 2009; Flew & Cunningham, 2010), they argue that critiques of neoliberalism have been too quick to presuppose liberal democratic assumptions (Fenton & Titley, 2015), invoking “democracy” as the solution without clearly grasping its co-opted condition in media regimes (see also Dean, 2009). In contrast to the comparative clarity of the “ideological battleground” mapped out in the media and communication studies debates of the early 1980s, when a theoretical division between Marxism and liberal pluralism was the defining antagonism of the field, the contemporary ‘critique’ of neoliberalism risks deflecting media scholars’ attention from a more fundamental ideological conflict with liberalism, as the political corollary of capitalist rule (Phelan & Dawes, 2018).
It is worthwhile referring back to those earlier ‘ideological’ debates (see Curran, 1990; Dawes, 2017), however, to situate Hall’s distinctive take on neoliberalism. Whereas the traditional political-economic wing of the critical paradigm emphasised the significance of economic ownership and critiqued the indirect influence of both state and market (Murdock & Golding, 1977; Murdock, 1982; Hood, 1980), the radical-cultural wing focused more on the media’s subordination to ideological control (Hall, 1977). As far as journalism and the media are concerned, the Glasgow University Media Group’s ‘concerted assault’ on the liberal-pluralist conception of PSB and the liberal rhetoric of press freedom is perhaps the ‘most salient development’ of this ideological approach (Curran, 1990: 137). Their critique of the extent to which much of supposedly objective TV reporting was actually grounded in the assumptions of dominant groups in society (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976; 1980; 1982; 1985) was accompanied by others, particularly from the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, who also argued that broadcasting coverage was structured in dominance and that the media had an ‘ideological effect’ (Hall, 1977), served dominant class interests and even misrepresented reality in a way that promoted false consciousness (Curran, 1990: 138).
Contemporary political-economy analyses of media and neoliberalism continue to be mostly underpinned by such a critical conception of ideology (see, e.g., Dean, 2009; Peck, 2015; Preston & Silke, 2011), whereby neoliberalism is seen as the legitimating ideology of a transnational corporate class (Harvey, 2005) who own and control the bulk of the world’s wealth, including most of its media resources. This ideology officially consecrates the values of consumer choice, individual freedom, and market competition. But the promise of a market utopia systematically obscures the real conditions of “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner & Theodore, 2002), based on corporatized, quasi-monopolistic media structures dominated by a small field of market players (Hope, 2012). Neoliberal ideology is thus equated, in an archetypal Marxist fashion (Eagleton, 1991), with ruling class ideas that mask the real conditions of social life in neoliberalized societies. These ideas are ingrained, albeit never absolutely dominant, in the discourses, perspectives, and norms that are privileged in corporate media (Chakravartty & Schiller, 2010; Freedman, 2014).
In contrast, Hall (1988) sought to develop a critical analysis of the social formation that went beyond the limitations of a Marxist economism, which he argued appealed to dogmatic theoretical formulas about the nature of capitalism over and above any open-ended analysis of the forces at work in a particular historical conjuncture. Birmingham School cultural studies retained a Marxist focus on the political constitution of the social totality, drawing in particular on the work of Gramsci, as well as a critical engagement with the work of Althusser, Laclau and Foucault. But in an attempt to go beyond the rigid class assumptions of orthodox Marxism, the concept of ideology was no longer equated with a relatively superficial domain of ideas, but recast as central to the social production of forms of neoliberal(ized) subjectivity (Hall, 1988). Hall added nuance to the classical Marxist concept of ‘ideology’ and its correlation of the ruling classes with ruling ideas, shifting attention instead to differences of ideological formation within dominant classes (Hall, 1988: 41) and to the internal contestation and displacement of ideas within a class (Hall, 1988: 41-42). He was particularly interested in how Thatcher’s policies could become popular among those that they could not possibly benefit, without limiting the explanation to a matter of false consciousness. From a classical Marxist perspective, Thatcherism was no different from traditional conservative ruling ideas, but for Hall it was the novelty of their (re)combination, of the contest within the ruling class, and the fragmentation of the traditional values of the opposing class, that made Thatcherism distinctive (Hall, 1988: 42). Critiquing Foucault, he argued not only that Thatcherism needed to be understood in terms of ideology and hegemony rather than simply power, but that it was not enough to identify the co-existence of different values; it was necessary to analyse their articulation (Hall, 1988: 53).
Following Gramsci, Hall insisted that we get the organic and conjunctural aspects of crises (which are never purely economic) into a proper relationship. Whereas the conjunctural signified the immediate terrains of struggle – that is, the ‘incessant and persistent’ efforts which are being made to defend and conserve a particular position – the organic is when those efforts go beyond mere defensiveness and become formative (Hall, 1979: 16). Although conjunctures can never be measured uniquely by the careers of single individuals (Hall, 1979: 19), Hall showed the significance of Enoch Powell’s focus on race, nation and free markets on what he called the ‘authoritarian populism’ of Thatcher’s politics (Hall, 1988: 38). Despite lending considerable weight to the importance of ideology, he argued that an analysis of ideology alone was not sufficient for an analysis of a conjuncture as a whole (Hall, 1988: 40). Of course it was important to analyse the policies aimed at reversing state-subsidised welfare and state intervention, restoring private enterprise and free market forces, and weakening the power of the trade unions (Hall, 1988: 39). But as well as the policies actually enacted by Thatcher’s governments, he argued that it was important to also consider the ideological effects of Thatcherism and the novel way it combined neoliberal values with traditional conservative values (family, nation, empire) to produce a contradictory ‘free market and strong state’ articulation (Hall, 1988: 38). This entailed a reversal of the dominant, commonsensical values of the postwar consensus, so that the “spell” of the welfare state would be broken (Hall, 1988: 39), and “the aura that used to attach to the value of the public welfare now adheres to anything that is private – or can be privatised” (Hall, 1988: 40), and not only in political and media discourse, but in everyday life. Not coincidentally, rather than limit analysis to the ideological apparatuses of the state, Hall also emphasised the need to focus on those that were private (particularly the British tabloid press).
Similarly, it was later important not just to highlight that the New Labour project had adapted to the neoliberal terrain – with their focus on market fundamentalism and the entrepreneurial values of efficiency, choice and selectivity, and with the entrepreneur becoming the principal social role model (Hall, 2003: 14) – but to analyse the distinctive way in which they did so through the rearticulation of previously incommensurable (social and market) values (Hall, 2003: 11), transforming social democracy into neoliberalism ideologically and materially (Hall, 2003: 12), forcing the public sector to mimic the market and the blurring the public-private distinction through a preference for ‘governance’ over government (Hall, 2003: 14-15).
What was distinctive about the New Labour variant was that they were a social democratic party, aiming to govern in a neoliberal way without losing their traditional working-class and public sector middle-class support – with all the contradictions that entails (Hall, 2003: 14). Although the state must govern less, they must do so entrepreneurially, focusing on competition, consumers and markets; combining economic neoliberalism with an ‘active government’ (Hall, 2003: 19), it was thus a continuation of neoliberalism ‘but in a transformed way’ (Hall, 2003: 15). However, although they combined both social democracy and neoliberalism to constitute a hybrid system, Hall maintained that neoliberalism remained dominant, with social democracy always being transformed into neoliberalism. Further, far from a static system, its hybridity is processual, and it is how those competing values are (re)articulated that matters. Ultimately, he argued that New Labour represented a social democratic variant of neoliberalism, whereas Thatcherism had represented a neoliberal variant of classical conservatism (Hall, 2003: 22), suggesting that Thatcher took conservatism and made it neoliberal, whereas Blair took neoliberalism and added increasingly watered down social democratic elements.
Hall himself had speculated that this socially ameliorative model of neoliberalism might be seen as the ‘best shell’ for global capitalism (2017: 311). From the perspective of 2020, we might further say that the third-way style of ‘soft’ or ‘progressive’ neoliberalism (Peck, 2010; Fraser, 2017) – i.e. the New Democrats in the US, New Labour in the UK, Trudeau in Canada – is on its last legs. Among the current crop of late-neoliberal mutations (such as Macron in France), the centrist project that was once its best face could prove to be the most irreparably compromised and most prone to authoritarian tendencies (Dawes & Peck, 2020; Fraser 2017; Mudge 2018). This raises the distinct prospect that some of the leading fronts of neoliberalization, going forward, may be authoritarian hybrids, with political management by control and coercion (witness the state-sanctioned violence against those protesting Macron’s reforms in France) rather than the production of consent (Peck and Theodore, 2019; Dawes & Peck, 2020).
But is Macron a neoliberal? Is Trump? Will Brexit mean more or less neoliberalism? Such questions are misleading because they reduce the issue to a form of essentialism. The reality of “a polycentric world of qualitatively different and coexistent forms of neoliberal restructuring, marked by various degrees of dialogue and interdependence, in which the rules of the game have themselves been tendentially neoliberalized” (Peck in Dawes, 2020) cannot be analysed, understood or critiqued in such terms. Rather, as Hall’s work reminds us, conjunctural analyses are needed to bring into view the distinctive articulation of diverse and incommensurable values and discourses; otherwise, we will not only miss what is specific to the contemporary moment – we will miss the opportunity to transform it.
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Simon Dawes 